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Abstract. Single-valued neutrosophic number (SVNN) is an appropriate extension of the ordinary fuzzy number. The key feature of the SVNN is that it can capture indeterminacy in the imprecise information. In real-life
problems, there are many situations where players of a matrix game can not assess their payoffs in terms of
ordinary fuzzy or intuitionistic fuzzy numbers. The SVNN is used as an excellent tool to handle such situations.
This paper explores matrix games with SVNN payoffs and investigates a non-linear programming approach to
solve such a game. First, two auxiliary non-linear multi-objective programming problems have been formulated.
Then, each of the two multi-objective programming problems is converted into two non-linear bi-objective programming problems. Finally, the lexicographic method is used to solve the reduced bi-objective programming
problems. It is worth mentioning that the values of the game for both the players are obtained in SVNN forms,
which is desirable. The applicability of the proposed approach is illustrated with a market share problem and
results are compared and analyzed with an existing method.

Keywords: Matrix game; single-valued neutrosophic number; multi-objective optimization; lexicographic
method.
—————————————————————————————————————————-

1. Introduction
Matrix game theory [17] gives a mathematical framework to conceive strategies that help
to overcome real-life conflicting situations. There are several types of mathematical games
[22, 24, 34], which have been broadly studied and successfully utilized in many areas. Many of
the real-life situations are uncertain due to the imprecision of data, asymmetric information,
and conflict of interest between opponents in the same field of business. So, it is difficult
to evaluate payoffs precisely. The players only approximate the payoffs with some imprecise
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degrees. The most vital and argued issue among the researchers is to settle how to handle the
uncertainty. Crisp data can not express most of these complicated structures correctly.
Fuzzy set (FS) was the first to successfully encounter the uncertainty which is not due to
the randomness of an event. FS represents each element with a degree of membership (DOM)
which lies between 0 and 1. In the literature, matrix games with fuzzy pay-offs have been
broadly studied and analyzed by numerous researchers. Campos [6] used a linear programming
approach to solve fuzzy matrix games. Bector et al. [3] used fuzzy linear programming duality
to solve matrix games with fuzzy goals and fuzzy pay-offs. Li [15] evolved several methods
to solve matrix games with payoffs as triangular fuzzy numbers. Verma and Kumar [30]
proposed the Mehar method for fuzzy matrix games. Seikh et al. [19] implemented an α-cut
based approach to solve fuzzy matrix games. Very recently, Seikh et al. [21] developed a
methodology to solve matrix games with hesitant fuzzy payoffs. Some recent references on
fuzzy matrix games are [12, 23, 25, 36].
FS considers only the DOM of the elements in a universe, which is a single value, and
cannot provide any additional information regarding the incomplete concept of the elements.
Atanassov [2] generalized the idea of FS to intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) where the degree of
non-membership (DONM) νX (x) ∈ [0, 1] is also attached with DOM µX (x) ∈ [0, 1] for each
element x ∈ X in a universe where 0 ≤ µX (x) + νX (x) ≤ 1. IFS outlines uncertainty more
correctly and descriptively than FS, as IFS considers both complete and incomplete imprecise
data. Nan et al. [16] proposed solution methodologies to study matrix games with payoffs
of triangular intuitionistic fuzzy numbers (TIFNs) [18]. Seikh et al. [20] accomplished an
approach to solve matrix games with intuitionistic fuzzy payoffs. Xing and Qiu [35] used the
accuracy function method to solve a matrix game where the payoffs are considered as TIFN.
However, in reality, the available information always contains some imprecise data which
consists of conflicting, unpredictable, and indeterminate information. The FS can not express
the DONM and the IFS does not control the indeterminacy of information. Neutrosophic sets
(NSs) [27] considers the degree of indeterminacy (DOI) ωX (x) ∈ [0, 1] together with the DOM
and DONM. Therefore, NS can capture more realistic data than that of FS and IFS. NSs are
represented by DOM (µ), DOI (ω), and DONM (ν) which are independent and 0 ≤ µ, ω, ν ≤ 1
provided 0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3. NS generalizes the classical set when ω = 0, µ, ν either 0 or 1
and µ + ω + ν = 1; the FS when ω = 0, 0 ≤ µ, ω, ν ≤ 1 and µ + ω + ν = 1; the IFS when
0 ≤ µ, ω, ν ≤ 1 and 0 < µ + ω + ν < 1. This concludes the fact that NS is a generalization
of a classical set, FS and IFS.
Wang et al. [31] conceptualized a single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS), a special form of
NS for realistic applications. SVNNs are a distinctive case of SVNSs. SVNN is an extension of
a fuzzy number (FN) and an intuitionistic fuzzy number (IFN). SVNS outlined the variables
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which are completely relevant for human prediction because of the imperfection of information
that human observes from the outer world. For example, the proposition “The newly launched
car Ψ would be the best seller”, has not any precise answer for the human brain as far as yes
or no, since indeterminacy is the segment of ignorance of the value of a proposition between
truth and lie. For that reason, the three components of the neutrosophic set are very much
suitable to exhibit the indeterminacy and inconsistency in the information.
To express the uncertainty of a conflicting circumstance, SVNNs are better to utilize instead
of FS/IFS. The following example shows the implication and the relevance of the use of SVNN
in real-life problems.
Suppose a smartphone manufacturing company ‘Alpha’ is going to launch a new item ‘Ω’
in the new year 2021. The company Alpha wants to estimate the number of selling a unit of
new products before starting its production. The selling of the new item depends on various
uncertain parameters such as new attracting features, the capacity of supply, the selling price,
advertisement of the product, etc. But, the company wants to know whether the guaranteed
selling unit would be 1 billion in the year or less’. The existence of this uncertain guaranteed
selling unit always contains some knowledge of ‘neutral’ (indeterminate/unknown) thought
besides ‘truth/membership’ and ‘falsehood/non-membership components that lie in FS/IFS.
This situation can not be revealed by FNs or IFNs and SVNN comes into consideration. Some
experts (say α, β, γ) are consulted for their opinions and they express their views in SVNNs.
Let the expert α give its opinion about the guaranteed selling unit as h0.8, 0.3, 0.4i. This
implies that the company has 80% chance to meet the goal positively and is unable to reach
the guaranteed selling unit by 40%. In this case, the expert α has a neutral thought that
Alpha has an indeterminacy to meet the goal by 30%.
Hence, the application of SVNS theory has been growing quickly in many research areas [4, 29, 32, 37, 38]. Selvachandran et al. [26] designed a modified TOPSIS (Technique for
Order Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution) with maximizing deviation method based on
the SVNS model. Garg and Nancy [9] discussed some new distance measures under the SVNS
environment and developed an algorithm for single-valued neutrosophic decision making based
on TOPSIS method. Garai et al. [8] investigated the weighted possibility mean for SVNNs and
developed a rigorous ranking methodology to solve multi-attribute decision making. Haque
et al. [11] presented a new exponential operational law for trapezoidal neutrosophic numbers
and studied pollution-related MCGDM problems in megacities. Chakraborty et al. [7] explored the classification of trapezoidal bipolar neutrosophic numbers and implemented the
de-bipolarization in cloud service-based MCGDM problem. Ahmed et al. [1] developed a new
approach to solve linear programming problems in bipolar single-valued neutrosophic environments.
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2. Motivation
With the use of SVNNs, the decision-maker can set greater flexibility and better dependability in the strategy-making process. Many uncertain situations are better to present by
SVNNs than FS/IFS. Moreover, in matrix games due to lack of information in the available
data, the DOI plays a vital role while assessing the payoff values. So, there are many uncertain
situations where players can assess payoffs of the matrix game problems in SVNN forms. This
useful requirement motivates us to investigate the matrix game with SVNN payoffs.
Here we develop a new methodology to solve matrix game problems with SVNN payoffs.
First, two multi-objective non-linear programming problems are constructed to get the optimal value and strategies for the players. Then multi-objective programming problems are
transferred into bi-objective non-linear programming problems by considering the same importance of the objective functions. Then the Lexicographic method [14] is used to solve the
reduced bi-objective programming problems. A market share problem is illustrated to show
the validity of the proposed methodology. The obtained results are discussed and compared
and the physical significance of the obtained results is explored. The key contributions of this
paper are augmented as under.
(1) This is the first attempt to solve matrix game with SVNN payoffs.
(2) To get the optimal strategies and optimal values of the players, two different nonlinear multi-objective programming problems are constructed. These multi-objective
programming problems are transferred to bi-objective problems by considering the
same importance of the two objective functions. Then Lexicographic method is used
to solve the bi-objective problems.
(3) Owen [17] proposed the concept of optimal strategies of the players and value of the
game for the crisp matrix game problem. Here, we extend the definition for SVNN
matrix game.
(4) The optimal values of the game for both the players are obtained in the SVNN forms,
which is desirable.
(5) A real-life market share problem is illustrated to check the applicability and validity
of the proposed approach.
The remainder of this paper is sorted out as follows. Some preliminaries on NS are recalled
in Section 3. Section 4 conceptualized the idea of SVNN matrix games. Section 5 is dedicated
to the solution process. In Section 6, a market share problem is illustrated to validate our
proposed methodology. Section 7 concludes the paper.
3. Preliminaries
Neutrosophic sets and their basic operations are recalled in this section.
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Definition 3.1. [28] M̃ = {hξ, (µM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ), νM̃ (ξ))i|ξ ∈ Ω, µM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ), νM̃ (ξ) ∈]− 0, 1+ [}
is said to be a neutrosophic set (NS) over a universe Ω, where µM̃ : Ω →]− 0, 1+ [; ωM̃ : Ω →
]− 0, 1+ [ and νM̃ : Ω →]− 0, 1+ [ are called respectively the membership function, indeterminacy
membership function and non-membership function and − 0 ≤ µM̃ (ξ) + ωM̃ (ξ) + νM̃ (ξ) ≤ 3+ .
Definition 3.2. [31] M̃ = {hξ, (µM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ), νM̃ (ξ))i|ξ ∈ Ω, µM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ), νM̃ (ξ) ∈ [0, 1]}
is said to be a single-valued neutrosophic set (SVNS) over a universe Ω, where µM̃ : Ω →
[0, 1], ωM̃ : Ω → [0, 1] and νM̃ : Ω → [0, 1] are called respectively the membership function,
indeterminacy membership function and non-membership function and 0 ≤ µM̃ (ξ) + ωM̃ (ξ)+
νM̃ (ξ) ≤ 3.
For convenience, hµM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ), νM̃ (ξ)i is called a single-valued neutrosophic number
(SVNN) which is usually represented by α̃ = hµ, ω, νi.
Definition 3.3. [31] Let M̃ and M̃ 0 be two SVNSs in the set Ω. M̃ ⊆ M̃ 0 if and only if
µ (ξ) ≤ µ 0 (ξ), ω (ξ) ≥ ω 0 (ξ) and ν (ξ) ≥ ν 0 (ξ) for any ξ ∈ Ω. Again M̃ ∼
= M̃ 0 if and
M̃

M̃

M̃

M̃

M̃

M̃

only if µM̃ (ξ) = µM̃ 0 (ξ), ωM̃ (ξ) = ωM̃ 0 (ξ) and νM̃ (ξ) = νM̃ 0 (ξ) for any ξ ∈ Ω.
Definition 3.4. [31] Let M̃ and M̃ 0 be two SVNSs in the set Ω. The intersection of M̃
and M̃ 0 is a SVNS C̃, written as C̃ = M̃ ∩ M̃ 0 , whose membership function, indeterminacy
membership function and non-membership functions are related to those of M̃ and M̃ 0 by
µC̃ (ξ) = min{µM̃ (ξ), µM̃ 0 (ξ)}, ωC̃ (ξ) = max{ωM̃ (ξ), ωM̃ 0 (ξ)} and νC̃ (ξ) = max{νM̃ (ξ), νM̃ 0 (ξ)}
for any ξ ∈ Ω.
Definition 3.5. [5] Let α̃ = hµ, ω, νi, α̃1 = hµ1 , ω1 , ν1 i and α̃2 = hµ2 , ω2 , ν2 i be three SVNNs,
and λ > 0, then their algebraic operations are defined as follows:
1. α̃1 + α̃2 = hµ1 + µ2 − µ1 µ2 , ω1 ω2 , ν1 ν2 i;
2. α̃1 − α̃2 = h1 − (1 − µ1 )(1 − µ2 )−1 , ω1 ω2 −1 , ν1 ν2 −1 i;
3. α̃1 × α̃2 = hµ1 µ2 , ω1 + ω2 − ω1 ω2 , ν1 + ν2 − ν1 ν2 i;
4. λα̃ = h1 − (1 − µ)λ , ω λ , ν λ i;
5. α̃λ = hµλ , 1 − (1 − ω)λ , 1 − (1 − ν)λ i.
4. Matrix Games with Pay-offs represented by SVNN
Consider <n+ as the non-negative orthant of n-dimensional Euclidean space. Let the pure
strategies h and ζk are chosen by Player-I and II with probabilities uh and vk respectively,
p
P
for h ∈ 41 and k ∈ 42 where 41 = {1, 2, . . . , p} and 42 = {1, 2, . . . , q}. If
uh = 1 and
q
P

h=1

vk = 1 for (u, v) ∈

<p+

×

<q+

where u = (u1 , u2 , . . . , up ) and v = (v1 , v2 , . . . , vq ), then u

k=1
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and v are called the mixed strategies for Player-I and II, respectively. Let the sets of all mixed
strategies for Player-I and Player-II are denoted by U and V respectively, where
p
n
o
X
p
U = u = (u1 , u2 , . . . , up ) ∈ <+ :
uh = 1 ,
h=1
q
o
n
X
vk = 1 .
V = v = (v1 , v2 , . . . , vq ) ∈ <q+ :
k=1

Let us consider the matrix Ñ = (ñhk )p×q , where ñhk = hµhk , ωhk , νhk i is a SVNN, which
represents the payoff for the Player-I. Then, the matrix game with SVNN payoffs is represented
by {U, V, Ñ }. From this, the two person matrix game {U, V, Ñ } with payoffs of SVNNs is
supposed to call as a SVNN matrix game Ñ .
For the choice of mixed strategy (u, v) ∈ U × V by Player-I and II, the expected payoff
Ẽ(u, v) for Player-I will be calculated as
Ẽ(u, v) = uT Ãv =

p X
q
X

ñhk uh vk

h=1 k=1
p X
q
X
=
hµhk , ωhk , νhk i uh vk
h=1 k=1
p
q Y
p
q Y
p
q Y
E
D
Y
Y
Y
uh vk
νhk
,
ωhk uh vk ,
(1 − µhk )uh vk ,
=
1−
k=1 h=1

k=1 h=1

k=1 h=1

which is still a SVNN.
Irrespective of the use of best strategies of the players, the maximum guaranteed gain (or
the minimum possible loss) is the value of the game for Player-I (or Player-II). According
to the maximin and minimax principles for Player-I and Player-II respectively, if for some
(u0 , v0 ) ∈ U × V , such that
T

u0 Ñ v0 = max min{uT Ñ v} = min max{uT Ñ v},
u∈U v∈V

v∈V u∈U

then in the sense of Definition 3.3, u0 and v0 are called optimal strategies for Player-I and
T

Player-II, respectively and u0 Ñ v0 is the value of SVNN matrix game Ñ .
Bector et al. [3] introduced the concept of a reasonable solution of the fuzzy matrix game.
Here we extend the definition of reasonable solution and solution for the SVNN matrix game
in the following definitions.
Definition 4.1. Let θ̃ and φ̃ be two SVNNs. Assume that there exist u∗ ∈ U and v∗ ∈ V
such that u∗ Ñ v ⊂ θ̃ and uÑ v̄∗ ⊃ φ̃ hold for any u ∈ U and v ∈ V , then (u∗ , v∗ , θ̃, φ̃) is called
a reasonable solution of the SVNN matrix game Ñ .
In this case, θ̃ and φ̃ are called reasonable values and u∗ ∈ U and v∗ ∈ V are called
reasonable strategies for Player-I and Player-II, respectively. The reasonable solution, which
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is defined in the above definition, does not represent the solution of the SVNN matrix game
Ñ . In the following definition, the concept of solution of SVNN matrix game Ñ is explored.
Definition 4.2. Assume that Θ and Φ are the sets of reasonable values for Player-I and II
respectively and θ̃∗ ∈ Θ and φ̃∗ ∈ Φ. If there do not exist θ̃0 ∈ Θ (θ̃0 6= θ̃∗ ) and φ̃0 ∈ Φ (φ̃0 6= φ̃∗ )
such that θ̃∗ ⊂ θ̃0 and φ̃∗ ⊃ φ̃0 , then (ū∗ , v̄∗ , θ̃∗ , φ̃∗ ) is said to be a solution of the SVNN matrix
game Ñ .
In this case, u∗ and v∗ are respectively called the maximin strategy for Player-I and minimax
strategy for Player-II. θ̃∗ is the gain floor for Player-I and φ̃∗ is the loss ceiling for Player-II.
5. Mathematical Model and Solution Approach for SVNN Matrix game
Suppose E(u)k is the expected payoff for Player-I when Player-I uses the mixed strategy
u ∈ U and Player-II chooses the pure strategy ζk , k ∈ 42 . Then
E(u)k = h1 −

p
Y

(1 − µhk )uh ,

p
Y

ωhk uh ,

uh
νhk
i.

h=1

h=1

h=1

p
Y

Let ρ = hµ, ω, νi is the minimum of E(u)k . Then, following Definition 3.3, we have
q

ρ = hµ, ω, νi = hmin{1 −
k=1

p
Y

q

(1 − µhk )uh }, max{
k=1

h=1

p
Y

q

ωhk uh }, max{
k=1

h=1

Obviously ρ is a function of u. Now to get the maximin strategy

p
Y

νhk uh }i.

h=1
u∗ ∈

(1)

U and gain-floor

ρ∗ , Player-I should choose the mixed strategy u∗ ∈ U in such a way that ρ is maximized.
Therefore following Definition 3.3 and Definition 4.2, we have
q

ρ∗ = hµ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ i = hmax min{1 −
u∈U k=1

p
Y

q

(1 − µhk )uh }, min max{
u∈U k=1

h=1

p
Y

q

ωhk uh }, min max{
u∈U k=1

h=1

p
Y

νhk uh }i. (2)

h=1

Similarly, let E(v)h is the expected payoff for Player-II, when Player-II chooses the mixed
strategy v ∈ V against Player-I’s pure strategy h , h ∈ 41 . Then
q
Y

E(v)h = h1 −

(1 − µhk )vk ,

k=1

q
Y

ωhk vk ,

k=1

q
Y

vk
νhk
i.

k=1

Let η = hα, β, γi is the maximum of E(v)h . Then, following Definition 3.3 and Definition
4.2, we have
p

η = hα, β, γi = hmax{1 −
h=1

q
Y

vk

p

(1 − µhk ) }, min{
h=1

k=1

q
Y

vk

p

ωhk }, min{
h=1

k=1

q
Y

νhk vk }i.

(3)

k=1

Clearly, η is a function of v. Now, to obtain minimax strategy v∗ ∈ V and loss-ceiling η ∗ ,
Player-II should choose the mixed strategy v∗ ∈ V in such a way that η is minimized. Then
following Definition 3.3, we have
p

η ∗ = hα∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ i = hmin max{1 −
v∈V h=1

q
Y

p

(1 − µhk )vk }, max min{

k=1

v∈V h=1

q
Y

k=1

p

ωhk vk }, max min{
v∈V h=1

q
Y

νhk vk }i. (4)

k=1
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Theorem 5.1. For SVNN matrix game Ñ , Player-I’s gain f loor does not exceed Player-II’s
loss ceiling, i.e., ρ∗ ⊆ η ∗ .
Proof. For any u ∈ U , it implies that
min{Ẽ(u, v)} ⊆ Ẽ(u, v).
v∈V

Similarly, for any v ∈ V , we have
Ẽ(u, v) ⊆ max{Ẽ(u, v)}.
u∈U

Thus, for any u ∈ U and v ∈ V , we obtain
min{Ẽ(u, v)} ⊆ max{Ẽ(u, v)}.
v∈V

u∈U

Therefore, min{Ẽ(u, v)} ⊆ min max{Ẽ(u, v)}.
v∈V

v∈V u∈U

Hence,
max min{Ẽ(u, v)} ⊆ min max{Ẽ(u, v)},
u∈U v∈V

i.e., ρ∗

⊆

v∈V u∈U

η∗.

Following Equation (1) and Equation (2), maximin strategy u∗ and the gain floor ρ∗ =
hµ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ i for Player-I can be obtained by solving the following multi-objective programming
problem (5)
max{µ}, min{ω}, min{ν}
p
p
p
Y
Y
Y
uh
uh
ωhk ≤ ω,
1−
(1 − µhk ) ≥ µ,
νhk uh ≤ ν, (k ∈ 42 )

s.t.

h=1
p
X

h=1

h=1

uh = 1, uh ≥ 0,

(5)

h=1

µ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, 0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3
p
Q

q

where µ = min{1 −
k=1

q

(1 − µhk )uh }, ω = max{

h=1

p
Q

k=1 h=1

q

ωhk uh and ν = max{

p
Q

k=1 h=1

νhk uh }.

Similarly, the following multi-objective programming problem (6) is constructed by following
Equation (3) and Equation (4) to obtain the minimax strategy v∗ and the loss-ceiling η ∗ =
hα∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ i for Player-II.

s.t.

min{α}, max{β}, max{γ}
q
q
q
Y
Y
Y
1−
(1 − µhk )vk ≤ α,
ωhk vk ≥ β,
νhk vk ≥ γ, (h ∈ 41 )
k=1
q
X

k=1

k=1

vk = 1, vk ≥ 0,

(6)

k=1

α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3,
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Q

h=1

k=1

where α = max{1 −

374
p

(1 − µhk )vk }, β = min{

q
Q

h=1 k=1

p

ωhk vk } and γ = min{

q
Q

h=1 k=1

νhk vk }.

In Problem (5), the objective functions ω and ν have the same importance, so we take the
average of these two functions. Again maximization of µ is equivalent to minimization of 1 − µ
and therefore Problem (5) reduces to the following Problem (7) as follows.
nω + ν o
,
2
p
p
p
Y
Y
Y
1−
(1 − µhk )uh ≥ µ,
ωhk uh ≤ ω,
νhk uh ≤ ν, (k ∈ 42 )

min{1 − µ}, min
s.t.

h=1
p
X

h=1

h=1

uh = 1, uh ≥ 0,

(7)

h=1

µ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, 0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3
Again, in Problem (6), the objective functions β and γ have the same importance, so we take
the average of these two functions. Again minimization of α is equivalent to the maximization
of 1 − α and therefore Problem (6) changes to Problem (8) as follows.
max{1 − α}, max
s.t.

1−

q
Y

nβ + γ o

(1 − µhk )vk ≤ α,

k=1
q
X

2
q
Y
k=1

q
Y

ωhk vk ≥ β,

νhk vk ≥ γ, (h ∈ 41 )

k=1

vk = 1, vk ≥ 0,

(8)

k=1

α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3
Clearly, Problem (7) and Problem (8) are bi-objective programming problems. There are
several methods to solve such problems. The notion of Pareto optimal is commonly-used to
solve such problems. Here, we use the Lexicographic method [14] to solve Problem (7) and
Problem (8).
For Problem (7), the following Problem (9) is constructed first.

s.t.

min{1 − µ}
p
p
p
Y
Y
Y
uh
uh
1−
(1 − µhk ) ≥ µ,
ωhk ≤ ω,
νhk uh ≤ ν, (k ∈ 42 )
h=1
p
X

h=1

uh = 1, uh ≥ 0,

h=1

(9)

h=1

µ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, 0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3
Let the solution of the non-linear programming Problem (9) is denoted by (u0 , µ0 , ω 0 , ν 0 ).
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Following the Lexicographic approach, Problem (10) is constructed by combining the Problem (7) and the solution of Problem (9) as follows.
min
s.t.

1−
p
X

nω + ν o
2
p
Y

p
Y

i=1

h=1

(1 − µhk )uh ≥ µ,

p
Y

ωhk uh ≤ ω,

νhk uh ≤ ν, (k ∈ 42 )

h=1

uh = 1, uh ≥ 0,

(10)

h=1

µ ≥ 0, ω ≥ 0, ν ≥ 0, 0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3
1 − µ ≤ 1 − µ0 , ω ≤ ω 0 , ν ≤ ν 0
The optimal solution (u∗ , µ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ ) will be obtained by solving Problem (10). Then it is
obvious to prove that (u∗ , µ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ ) is a Pareto optimal solution of Problem (7).
Similarly, Problem (8) turns into solving Problem (11) at first according to the Lexicographic
method.

s.t.

max{1 − α}
q
q
q
Y
Y
Y
νhk vk ≥ γ, (h ∈ 41 )
ωhk vk ≥ β,
(1 − µhk )vj ≤ α,
1−
k=1

k=1

k=1
q
X

vk = 1, vk ≥ 0

(11)

k=1

α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3
Let (v0 , α0 , β 0 , γ 0 ) is the optimal solution of Problem (11). Then Problem (12) is formulated
by following the lexicographic approach as follows.
max
s.t.

1−

nβ + γ o

q
Y

2
vk

(1 − µhk )

k=1
q
X

≤ α,

q
Y

ωhk

k=1

vk

≥ β,

q
Y

νhk vk ≥ γ, (h ∈ 41 )

k=1

vk = 1, vk ≥ 0

(12)

k=1

α ≥ 0, β ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3
1 − α ≥ 1 − α0 , β ≥ β 0 , γ ≥ γ 0
Let (v∗ , α∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ ) is the optimal solution of Problem (12). Then obviously the solution
(v∗ , α∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ ) will be the Pareto optimal solution of Problem (8).
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5.1. Algorithm
The algorithm for solving SVNN matrix game by the proposed approach is abstracted as
follows.
Step-1: Consider a matrix game with payoffs of SVNNs.
Step-2: To solve the game, two nonlinear multi-objective programming problems are formulated.
Step-3: Considering the same preference to the DOI and DONM, the multi-objective programming problems are converted to corresponding bi-objective programming problems.
Step-4: Lexicographic method is used to counter the bi-objective programming problems and
the optimal strategies for the players are obtained.
The corresponding algorithmic flowchart of the proposed approach is presented in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Algorithmic flowchart of the proposed approach

6. Numerical Example
This subsection provides a market share problem to illustrate the solution procedure of a
SVNN matrix game.
6.1. New factory set up-management problem
Assume that a renowned foreign car manufacturing company ‘X’ is going to launch a new
factory in India. For smooth functioning of the factory, the industrial manufacturing organization of the company ‘X’ suggests setting up the new factory either in the state Gujrat
or in Hariyana, after considering various government policies and environmental conditions.
The respective Ministry of Labour and Welfare department looks into the matter on behalf of
their state governments and they jump to take the opportunity for a new industrial agreement,
though their resources are limited. In that case, the respective Ministry of both states acts
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wisely and anticipates opponents’ moves. The relationship of the two departments of the states
can be regarded as the two players of the game. Here, we assume that the Ministry for Gujrat
and Hariyana as Player-I and Player-II, respectively, and the opportunity to get the agreement
as payoff values. Player-I and II has limited resources but they frame the game problem as
to develop respective strategies and maximize the opportunity to build the new factory. In
a zero-sum game, the opportunity gain by Player-I is positive and negative for Player-II. It
is unrealistic for the decision-maker (DM) to get accurate and complete information on the
payoff values. In this case, the SVNNs are used to express uncertainty.
Suppose that the marketing research team (MRT) of the company ‘X’ receives the information from the respective Ministry of the two states by following mainly three aspects likeAvailability of Raw materials (strategy-I), Labour supply- including workers with the right
skills (strategy-II) and Grants and financial incentives- usually from the government (strategyIII). These aspects may be considered as strategies of the two different states. Then according
to the view of the MRT of the company ‘X’, the opportunity for Player-I is estimated and
evaluated by using linguistic terms as follows.

I




Ñ = II 
III

I

II

Very High

High

Low

III
Medium

Very High

Medium

Very Low

High



.

Very High

Table 1 shows the corresponding relations between linguistic terms and SVNNs. Then the
Table 1. Assigned SVNN corresponding to linguistic term
Linguistic term
SVNN

Very High

High

Medium

Low

Very Low

h0.95, 0.07, 0.05i h0.7, 0.5, 0.25i h0.5, 0.4, 0.4i h0.25, 0.3, 0.7i h0.05, 0.1, 0.95i

pay-off matrix Ã with payoffs of SVNNs may be transformed according to Table 1 as follows.
I


II

III


h0.95, 0.07, 0.05i

h0.70, 0.50, 0.25i

h0.50, 0.40, 0.40i


Ã = II  h0.25, 0.30, 0.70i

h0.95, 0.07, 0.05i


h0.70, 0.50, 0.25i  ,

h0.50, 0.40, 0.40i

h0.05, 0.10, 0.95i

h0.95, 0.07, 0.05i

I
III

where h0.95, 0.07, 0.05i in the matrix Ã is a SVNN which represents that Player-I will get the
opportunity to set up the new project positively by 95%, unable to get the opportunity by
5%. Player-I has an indeterminacy about the establishment of the new project by 7%. These
situation occur only when both of the players use the strategy I simultaneously. Other SVNNs
in Ã have also a similar explanation.
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6.2. The solution procedure and result discussion
Problem (13) is formulated by following Problem (9) as follows.
min{1 − µ}
s.t. 1 − 0.05u1 0.75u2 0.5u3 ≥ µ, 1 − 0.3u1 0.05u2 0.95u3 ≥ µ, 1 − 0.5u1 0.3u2 0.05u3 ≥ µ,
0.07u1 0.3u2 0.4u3 ≤ ω, 0.5u1 0.07u2 0.1u3 ≤ ω, 0.4u1 0.5u2 0.07u3 ≤ ω,
0.05u1 0.7u2 0.4u3 ≤ ν, 0.25u1 0.05u2 0.95u3 ≤ ν, 0.4u1 0.25u2 0.05u3 ≤ ν,
u1 + u2 + u3 = 1, u1 , u2 , u3 ≥ 0,

(13)

0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3, µ, ω, ν ≥ 0.
Solving Equation (13), the obtained optimal solution is µ0 = 0.772989, ω 0 = 1 and ν 0 = 1.
According to Equation (10), Problem (14) is constructed as follows.
min

s.t.

nω + ν o

2
1 − 0.05u1 0.75u2 0.5u3 ≥ µ, 1 − 0.3u1 0.05u2 0.95u3 ≥ µ, 1 − 0.5u1 0.3u2 0.05u3 ≥ µ,
0.07u1 0.3u2 0.4u3 ≤ ω, 0.5u1 0.07u2 0.1u3 ≤ ω, 0.4u1 0.5u2 0.07u3 ≤ ω
0.05u1 0.7u2 0.4u3 ≤ ν, 0.25u1 0.05u2 0.95u3 ≤ ν, 0.4u1 0.25u2 0.05u3 ≤ ν
1 − µ ≤ 0.227011, ω ≤ 1, ν ≤ 1

(14)

0 ≤ µ + ω + ν ≤ 3, µ, ω, ν ≥ 0
u1 + u2 + u3 = 1, u1 , u2 , u3 ≥ 0.
Solving Problem (14), the obtained optimal solution is u∗ = (0.3151, 0.3138, 0.3711), and
ρ∗ = hµ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ i = h0.7228, 0.2476, 0.2476i.
Now for Player-II, Problem (15) is constructed by following Equation (11), as follows.
max{1 − α}
s.t.

1 − 0.05v1 0.3v2 0.5v3 ≤ α, 1 − 0.75v1 0.05v2 0.3v3 ≤ α, 1 − 0.5v1 0.95v2 0.05v3 ≤ α,
0.07v1 0.5v2 0.4v3 ≥ β, 0.3v1 0.07v2 0.5v3 ≥ β, 0.4v1 0.1v2 0.07v3 ≥ β,
0.05v1 0.25v2 0.4v3 ≥ γ, 0.7v1 0.05v2 0.25v3 ≥ γ, 0.4v1 0.95v2 0.05v3 ≥ γ,
v1 + v2 + v3 = 1, v1 , v2 , v3 ≥ 0,

(15)

0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3, α, β, γ ≥ 0.
Solving Equation (15), the obtained optimal solution is α0 = 0.7346452, β 0 = 0 and γ 0 = 0.
Seikh, M. R. and Dutta, S., A Nonlinear Programming Model to Solve Matrix Games with Pay-offs of
Single-valued Neutrosophic Numbers

Neutrosophic Sets and Systems, Vol. 47, 2021

379

Then following Equation (12), Problem (16) is constructed as follows.
nβ + γ o
max
2
v3
v2
v1
s.t.
1 − 0.05 0.3 0.5 ≤ α, 1 − 0.75v1 0.05v2 0.3v3 ≤ α, 1 − 0.5v1 0.95v2 0.05v3 ≤ α,
0.07v1 0.5v2 0.4v3 ≥ β, 0.3v1 0.07v2 0.5v3 ≥ β, 0.4v1 0.1v2 0.07v3 ≥ β,
0.05v1 0.25v2 0.4v3 ≥ γ, 0.7v1 0.05v2 0.25v3 ≥ γ, 0.4v1 0.95v2 0.05v3 ≥ γ,
1 − α ≥ 0.2653548, 0 ≤ α + β + γ ≤ 3, α, β, γ ≥ 0,

(16)

v1 + v2 + v3 = 1, v1 , v2 , v3 ≥ 0.
Solving Problem (16), the optimal obtained solution is v∗ = (0.1807, 0.4255, 0.3938), and
η ∗ = hα∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ i = h0.7346, 0.1116, 0.1518i.
The following observations can be made for the results obtained.
(1) ρ∗ = hµ∗ , ω ∗ , ν ∗ i = h0.7228, 0.2476, 0.2476i represents that the state Gujrat has the
opportunity to set up the new factory positively by 72.28% and unable to get the
opportunity by 24.76%. Also, it is indeterminate to assume that the state Gujrat will
get the opportunity by 24.76%. In this case, strategies I, II and III are chosen with
probability 0.3151, 0.3138 and 0.3711, respectively.
(2) η ∗ = hα∗ , β ∗ , γ ∗ i = h0.7346, 0.1116, 0.1518i represents that the state Hariyana has the
opportunity to set up the new factory positively by 73.46% and unable to get the
opportunity by 11.16%. Whereas, it is indeterminate to say that the state Hariyana
will get the opportunity by 15.18%. In this case, strategies I, II and III are chosen
with probability 0.1807,0.4255, and 0.3938, respectively.
(3) ρ∗ and η ∗ are obtained as SVNN, which is desirable.
(4) It is clear that µ∗ ≤ α∗ , ω ∗ ≥ β ∗ , ν ∗ ≥ γ ∗ , then ρ∗ ⊆ η ∗ , which follows Theorem 5.1.
(5) For

the

maximin

and minimax strategy

v∗

strategy

u∗

=

(0.3151, 0.3138, 0.3711)

= (0.1807, 0.4255, 0.3938), the expected payoff for Player-

I is E(u∗ , v∗ ) = h0.7713, 0.1862, 0.2083i, which is the value of SVNN matrix game Ñ .
From Table 1, it is to conclude that the expected payoff for Player-I is between “Very
High” and “High” in terms of linguistic terms.

6.3. Analysis and comparison of results with Li and Nan [13] approach
NS takes into consideration the indeterminacy together with the membership and nonmembership whereas intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) consider membership and non-membership
and ignore indeterminacy of the elements. So NS is the generalization of IFS. Therefore
Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy number [2] is a particular case of SVNN as we can simply
consider the sum of three independent functions as equal to 1.
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To verify the efficiency of the proposed approach, at first, we transfer the payoff matrix
Ñ with payoffs as SVNN to a payoff matrix Ñ 0 with Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets by
considering the DOI as zero, where
I


II

III


h0.95, 0.05i

h0.70, 0.25i

h0.50, 0.4i


Ñ 0 = II  h0.25, 0.70i

h0.95, 0.05i


h0.70, 0.25i  .

h0.50, 0.40i

h0.05, 0.95i

h0.95, 0.05i

I
III

Here, the payoff matrix Ñ 0 is the same as the payoff matrix considered in the paper of Li
and Nan [13]. Li and Nan [13] proposed a nonlinear programming approach to solve matrix
game with payoffs of Atanassov’s intuitionistic fuzzy sets. Li and Nan [13] use the weighted
average method to solve a pair of nonlinear programming models which are derived from two
auxiliary nonlinear bi-objective programming models. We use the proposed technique for the
payoff matrix Ñ 0 and obtained results are shown in Table 2. Table 2 also shows the results
obtained by Li and Nan [13] approach for the mid-value 0.5 of the interval of the weight λ.
Table 2. Results for the matrix game with pay-off matrix Ã0
u∗

Articles

v∗

E(u∗ , v∗ )

Li and Nan [13] (for λ = 0.5)

(0.4076,0.3325,0.2599)

(0.2681,0.2958,0.4361)

h0.7729, 0.2035i

Our proposed technique

(0.4009,0.3292,0.2699)

(0.2770,0.2972,0.4258)

h0.7730, 0.2037i

Table 2 shows that the optimal expected value obtained by the proposed technique discussed
in this paper is h0.7729, 0.2035i and obtained by Li and Nan [13] approach is h0.7730, 0.2037i,
which implies the fact that the optimal value for both of the players obtained by the proposed
method and Li and Nan [13] approach are approximately the same. Table 2 shows that PlayerI chooses three strategies (I, II, and III) with probability 0.4076,0.3325, 0.2599 respectively
which is obtained through the proposed approach, whereas Player-I choose the same strategies
with probability 0.4009, 0.3292, and 0.2699 respectively which is obtained through Li and
Nan [13] approach. This implies that the optimal strategies for both players are very similar.
The approach discussed in this paper considers DOI together with the DOM and the DONM.
Therefore, the proposed method is an extension of Li and Nan [13] method and counter
uncertainty in a larger sense. This manifests the effectiveness and validity of the proposed
technique.
7. Conclusion
SVNN is a vital tool to tackle uncertainty in decision-making problems. This paper uses
SVNNs to represent the imprecise payoffs so that players can consider the neutrality of the
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elements better. In this paper, a solution procedures is established to solve a new matrix game
where the payoffs are represented by SVNNs. Two non-linear multi-objective programming
problems are formulated to obtain the optimal values and optimal strategies for the players.
These multi-objective programming problems are transformed to bi-objective programming
problems by considering the same importance of the objective functions. Then Lexicographic
method is applied to counter the bi-objective programming problems.
The proposed approach is illustrated by solving a market share problem, which implies the
validity and effectiveness of the proposed approach. The optimal solutions are obtained in
SVNN form, which is desirable. We consider the matrix game problem from Li and Nan [13]
with payoffs as IFSs and the proposed approach is illustrated by considering the DOI as zero.
The obtained results are compared with the results obtained by Li and Nan’s [13] approach
and observed that the optimal strategies for both players are very similar. This demonstrates
the reliability of our approach.
The limitation of the proposed approach is that it does not find the solution to the game
problem directly, as it considers the construction of multi-objective programming problems.
Also, we do not make any conclusion about the existence of the solution of the SVNN matrix
game in the sense discussed in this paper. Therefore these problems need a further investigation
in the future.
The proposed methods are indeed able to solve SVNN matrix games. Moreover, the concept
of this work is readily applicable to other games such as two-person non-zero-sum games, multiobjective matrix game problems. Although the discussed approach is applied to solve a market
share problem, the proposed approach may be applied in management science, war science,
economics, advertising, cyber security related problems. In addition, a pair of nonlinear biobjective programming problems is derived from the two auxiliary nonlinear multi-objective
programming problems and countered by using the Lexicographic method. Therefore, other
new methods for solving matrix games with payoffs of the SVNNs may be investigated in the
near future.
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